The M23 rebel movement has taken control of significant cities in the DRC, outpacing the FARDC despite its larger troop numbers. Systemic corruption, low morale, and inadequate training hinder the FARDC’s effectiveness, while Rwanda’s military support for M23 complicates the situation. Historical divisions and poor leadership exacerbate the struggle, necessitating extensive military reforms over time.
Since January, the M23 rebel group has captured Goma and Bukavu, critical cities in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and has positioned itself for long-term governance in these areas. The Congolese armed forces (FARDC) numbered approximately 135,000 soldiers in 2022, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, but this figure is believed to have increased since then. In contrast, the United Nations estimates M23 comprises only a few thousand fighters, bolstered by around 4,000 Rwandan troops.
Despite Congolese President Felix Tshisekedi’s efforts to bolster military funding, raising it to $794 million (€732 million), concerns persist regarding the effectiveness of the FARDC against the M23’s territorial gains. “One of the main factors explaining the weakness of the FARDC lies in systemic corruption,” stated Alain De Neve, a researcher at the Royal Higher Institute for Defence in Brussels. He highlighted numerous reports of embezzlement of funds intended for military personnel and logistics, contributing to low morale and high desertion rates among troops.
The FARDC has often been perceived as a “self-service shop” for military leaders seeking personal enrichment, as noted by Ciaran Wrons-Passmann, director of the German Ecumenical Network for Central Africa. Reports indicate that senior officers have inflated troop numbers to receive additional funding from Kinshasa, leading to a disparity between reported and actual military capabilities.
The FARDC grapples with deep-rooted issues such as inadequate training, poor equipment, and insufficient communication resources. A Reuters report characterized the FARDC as a force impeded by persistent problems, where efforts at reform have not led to improvement. Although improved pay was announced, observers like Jakob Kerstan have pointed out that salaries remain low compared to private mercenaries, crippling troop morale and unity.
Training and equipment deficits have hindered the FARDC’s operational readiness against M23 forces, which utilize effective combat tactics suited to the challenging terrain of North Kivu. Despite reform initiatives, the FARDC’s technology and logistics remain outdated, with even basic coordination sometimes managed through informal channels like Whatsapp.
Another critical issue stems from widespread nepotism and a lack of capable military leadership, as De Neve noted a preference for promoting loyalty over competence. This has resulted in poor strategic decisions and a military characterized by internal fragmentation. Frequent leadership changes also signify difficulties in recruiting reliable officers equipped to form a cohesive military strategy.
Historically, the DRC military has been influenced by a legacy of division, a sentiment echoed by Kerstan regarding President Mobutu Sese Seko’s strategic standoff against empowering the army. The army’s dysfunction is now further compounded by Rwanda’s overt influence, which has led to hesitance in engaging with M23 in negotiations for fear of infiltration.
Tshisekedi acknowledged the army’s historical neglect, attributing part of the FARDC’s current struggles to the enduring effects of leadership under former presidents who failed to rebuild the armed forces adequately. The DRC government is actively pursuing military reforms, though the pace of change is slow, as stated by Patrick Muyaya, who underscored the complexity of resolving these entrenched issues successfully within a short timeframe.
The challenges faced by the FARDC in opposing the M23 rebel group are multifaceted, encompassing systemic corruption, inadequate training and equipment, and a legacy of division exacerbated by past leadership failures. Despite increased military spending and reform efforts by the Congolese government, the effectiveness of the armed forces continues to be undermined by cronyism and disorganization, while external factors such as Rwandan support for M23 further complicate the security landscape in the DRC. Comprehensive military reform remains essential but requires sustained effort and time to yield substantial results.
Original Source: www.dw.com
