Fuel smuggling in Iran has evolved into a serious economic crisis, involving the daily disappearance of 20 to 30 million liters of fuel. Estimated losses exceed $30 billion annually, with profits enriching influential regime figures. Despite acknowledgment of the problem by government officials, efforts to combat this corruption remain ineffective, highlighting a network deeply embedded within the regime’s power structure and thwarting potential reforms.
Fuel smuggling has emerged as a significant economic crisis in Iran, with estimates indicating a loss of 20 to 30 million liters of fuel daily. This illicit activity is not attributed to minor criminals but rather to an organized network, which benefits influential regime figures. The profits from this trafficking sustain not only the smuggling operations but also reinforce the regime’s power structure.
The scale of fuel smuggling was acknowledged during a parliamentary impeachment session, wherein the Minister of Economic Affairs highlighted that it exceeds $30 billion annually. With an alarming daily smuggling volume of 20 million liters of diesel, the annual equivalent amounts to 320 trillion tomans. Redirecting such revenue could provide significant financial support to each Iranian citizen, emphasizing the weight of this issue throughout the population.
President Masoud Pezeshkian pointed out that smugglers profit from government-subsidized diesel, selling it at exorbitant prices in black markets. The illicit earnings from diesel smuggling surpass 500 trillion tomans yearly. Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i, the Chief Justice, admitted that efforts to combat fuel smuggling have largely failed, underscoring the deep integration of the smuggling system within the regime.
Energy expert Mahamoud Khaghani noted the entrenchment of the smuggling network within Iran’s political ecosystem, referring to former President Hassan Rouhani’s acknowledgment of the powerful individuals controlling economic liquidity and markets. Attempts to enforce budget transparency in 2018 faced fierce resistance, culminating in public protests and a governmental retreat, illustrating the overwhelming influence of the oil mafia.
The dynamics of fuel smuggling in Iran are comparable to the situation in Mexico, where powerful criminal organizations dominate the oil sector. Khaghani stressed that Iran’s oil mafia is similarly structured, allowing sophisticated smuggling operations to thrive without the involvement of minor criminals. Former Oil Minister Bijan Zanganeh, too, recognized the pervasive infiltration of the oil industry by corruption, highlighting the systemic challenges in addressing this issue.
Khaghani posits that confronting the entrenched oil mafia within Iran has become increasingly untenable. President Pezeshkian, initially an advocate for exposing the underlying economic power dynamics, finds himself constrained in his ability to address these issues. This highlights a broader reality: the intertwining of corruption and institutional integrity within Iran’s political and economic landscape, perpetuating the cycle of economic mismanagement affecting the Iranian populace.
In conclusion, fuel smuggling is a pervasive crisis in Iran that not only exemplifies the country’s economic woes but also illustrates the extensive corruption within its power structure. The acknowledgment by officials of the scale of this issue suggests that substantial financial resources are being lost, which could otherwise benefit the citizens of Iran. The resistance faced by efforts to combat this corruption, along with the complexities of the smuggling network, reveal deep-seated challenges in enacting meaningful reform despite the evident need for systemic change.
Original Source: irannewsupdate.com
