As night envelops Cúcuta, Colombia, smuggling activities flourish, utilizing clandestine routes to bypass law enforcement. Despite the border’s reopening in 2022, criminal enterprises remained entrenched, resorting to extortion and violence while undermining legitimate commerce. Economic disparities drive illicit trade, indicating a complex landscape of illicit operations amid ongoing distrust of Venezuelan authorities.
As night descends upon Cúcuta, Colombia’s vibrant border town, nefarious activities thrive, cloaked in darkness. Each dusk, clandestine paths connecting Cúcuta to Venezuela transform into corridors of smuggling, as illicit goods effortlessly bypass law enforcement efforts. A prominent business figure disclosed to InSight Crime, “While we sleep, countless things happen in the city. And yes, smuggling is one of them.” The closure of the Colombia-Venezuela border by President Nicolás Maduro in February 2019 was a direct response to thwart humanitarian aid attempts by opposition factions. This decision inadvertently revitalized smuggling operations via “trochas,” which became crucial conduits for illegal trade and the trafficking of migrants. The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated these criminal activities, further solidifying their foothold. The official reopening of the border on September 26, 2022, raised hopes for reinstating lawful commerce and dismantling smuggling routes. However, this optimistic outlook has notably failed to materialize. Criminal organizations remain deeply entrenched in illicit trade, and to compensate for modest declines in revenue, they have intensified their extortion tactics targeting local residents. Transit routes such as the Simón Bolívar and Atanasio Girardot bridges facilitate the transportation of goods into Venezuela. Yet, illegal smuggling continues seamlessly through trochas, utilizing methods including foot transport, motorcycles, and vehicles, often under the complacent gaze of authorities. Historically, in 2008, bilateral trade soared to approximately $7 billion annually. Following the reopening of the border, business leaders anticipated a rebound to at least $2 billion in the first fiscal year; however, current estimates indicate the figure hovers below $1.2 billion due to persisting challenges. Despite some enterprises capitalizing on official crossings for bookkeeping advantages, pervasive distrust of Venezuelan authorities hinders a return to normalized trade, prompting reliance on unofficial channels. Ronal Rodríguez from the Universidad del Rosario noted, “With the trochas, there’s just one payment, and the cargo is secure.” Moreover, Venezuelan checkpoints impose fees, and the country’s sanction-induced economic struggles further complicate seamless trade conditions. Local smuggling networks, exploiting significant price discrepancies, continue to facilitate the movement of food and other essential goods from Colombia into Venezuela. Common examples include Colombian milk, procured at $0.90 per unit, which often sells at nearly double the cost in Venezuela without adhering to essential health regulations. Similarly, smuggled potatoes are distributed unchecked, posing considerable health threats to consumers. The tracks frequently fall under the control of armed factions, notably the ELN and Venezuela’s Tren de Aragua. Despite the border’s reopening, these criminal elements have adapted their operations, leading to heightened distress among Cúcuta’s inhabitants. Historically, the trochas served as consistent revenue sources for armed groups through extortion; however, with a recurring decline in smuggling profits, they now pursue new avenues, exacerbating the local climate of fear. The ELN continues to thrive, exploiting transporters using these routes and engaging in drug trafficking, as reported by a local journalist. Conversely, Tren de Aragua faces challenges in maintaining revenue streams and has resorted to threatening local businesses in Cúcuta for protection payments. This shift has sparked a notable rise in violence, with increased incidents of grenade attacks and competition for control over lucrative criminal enterprises.
The ongoing smuggling along the Colombia-Venezuela border has persisted due to a historic backdrop of political tension, economic disparities, and recent illicit trade developments. President Nicolás Maduro’s 2019 border closure was intended to repel humanitarian aid but catalyzed smuggling operations through makeshift paths known as trochas. The subsequent COVID-19 pandemic further entrenched these networks, complicating trade and fostering a culture of distrust towards official channels. The reopening in 2022 sparked hopes for recovery, but entrenched criminal activities and extortion remain prevalent, indicating the complexity of re-establishing lawful trade relations.
The persistent issue of smuggling along the Colombia-Venezuela border underscores deeply rooted economic, political, and social challenges. Despite hopes for improvement following the border’s reopening, criminal enterprises continue to exploit the situation, leading to heightened violence and insecurity among local communities. The dynamics of trade have shifted, revealing an ongoing struggle between illicit operations and legitimate commerce as distrust towards authorities hampers development.
Original Source: insightcrime.org
